

**COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA**  
**CITIZENS INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION**  
**FINAL REPORT**  
**DECEMBER 8, 2021**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	3
II.	CRITERIA USED IN DRAWING MAP .....	3
a.	Criterion One: United States Constitution .....	4
b.	Criterion Two: Federal Voting Rights Act .....	6
c.	Criterion Three: California Voting Rights Act.....	10
d.	Criterion Four: Contiguity.....	10
e.	Criterion Five & Criterion Six: Integrity of Neighborhoods, Communities of Interest, Cities & Census Designated Places .....	10
f.	Criterion Seven: Easily Identifiable & Understandable Boundaries .....	12
g.	Criterion Eight: Compactness.....	12
h.	No Purposeful Favoritism For or Discrimination Against Political Parties, Incumbents, or Political Candidates .....	12
III.	DETAILS ABOUT THE DISTRICTS .....	12

## APPENDICES

**Appendix 1:** Final Map & District Statistics

**Appendix 2:** District Maps

**Appendix 3:** Commission Members

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Citizens Independent Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”) for Santa Barbara County (the “County”) has completed the creation of district maps for the Board of Supervisors in accordance with the provisions of section 2-10.9A of the Santa Barbara County Code and applicable state and federal law. The final map has received the Commission’s *unanimous* approval and has been filed with the Santa Barbara County Clerk, Recorder, and Assessor and Registrar of Voters.

A group of 11 citizens, chosen from an applicant pool of nearly 200, engaged in an extraordinary and historic effort amidst a global pandemic to conduct an open and transparent public process designed to receive input from the people of Santa Barbara County about their communities and desires for fair and effective representation.

The amount of public participation has been impressive. Through the course of over three dozen public meetings, hearings, and public workshops, hundreds of County residents participated virtually and in person, and more than a thousand public comments were submitted. In addition, extensive participation in the form of draft maps, 114 of them, were received from a variety of individuals and groups.

The Commission is proud to have served the people of the County, and it now urges everyone to embrace this historic process and support the resulting maps that were created in collaboration with the public.

## II. CRITERIA USED IN DRAWING MAP

In 2018, the voters of Santa Barbara County approved Measure G, which formed an 11-member independent redistricting commission to establish the boundaries of the County’s supervisorial districts on a decennial basis. (Santa Barbara County Code, § 2-10.9A.) Federal, state, and county law together comprise the legal framework for drawing the districts. This framework establishes a number of map-drawing criteria in descending order of priority, starting with the United States Constitution, followed by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq.) (the “Voting Rights Act”), and then a set of traditional redistricting criteria.

In order of descending priority, the criteria are:

- (1) Districts shall comply with the United States Constitution and a shall be substantially equal in population.<sup>1</sup>
- (2) Districts shall comply with the federal Voting Rights Act.

---

<sup>1</sup> State law provides that population equality “shall be based on the *total population* of residents of the county as determined by the most recent federal decennial census.” (Elec. Code § 21500, subd. (a)(1) [emphasis added].) Moreover, in conformity with state law, the Commission utilized total population data which was adjusted to reflect certain incarcerated persons at their last residential address. (*Id.*, subd. (a)(2).)

- (3) Districts shall comply with the California Voting Rights Act.
- (4) To the extent practicable, districts shall be geographically contiguous.
- (5) To the extent practicable, the geographic integrity of any local neighborhood or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes its division.
- (6) To the extent practicable, the geographic integrity of a city or census designated place shall be respected in a manner that minimizes its division.
- (7) District boundaries should be easily identifiable and understandable by residents, meaning that, to the extent practicable, districts shall be bounded by natural and artificial barriers, by streets, or by the boundaries of the County.
- (8) To the extent practicable, and where it does not conflict with the preceding criteria, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographic compactness in a manner that nearby areas of population are not bypassed in favor of more distant populations.

(See Elec. Code § 21500; Santa Barbara County Code, § 2-10.9A, subd. (6).)

Importantly, state and county law define a “community of interest” to exclude relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates. (Elec. Code § 21500, subd. (c)(2); Santa Barbara County Code, § 2-10.9A, subd. (6)(a)(6).) Further, the Commission is prohibited from adopting district boundaries for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against political parties, incumbents, or political candidates. (Elec. Code § 21500, subd. (d); Santa Barbara County Code, § 2-10.9A, subd. (6)(b).)

As explained below, the Commission adhered to these criteria. As a result, the Commission’s map provides an opportunity to achieve effective and fair representation—precisely what the voters intended when they enacted Measure G.

#### **a. Criterion One: United States Constitution**

The Commission’s highest-ranking criterion is to comply with the United States Constitution. The federal Constitution prohibits substantial disparities in total population between electoral districts in the same districting plan, known as the principle of “one person, one vote.” (*Baker v. Carr* (1962) 369 U.S. 186.) Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the use of race when it “predominates” in the redistricting process unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.

#### *Population Equality*

The United States Constitution’s population-equality requirement for state legislative districts, including county supervisorial districts, derives from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (*Reynolds v. Sims* (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 568.) In contrast to the strict

standard applicable to congressional districts, when drawing state legislative districts, the United States Supreme Court allows jurisdictions “to deviate somewhat from perfect population equality to accommodate traditional districting objectives, among them, preserving the integrity of political subdivisions, maintaining communities of interest, and creating geographic compactness.” (*Evenwel v. Abbott* (2016) 136 S.Ct. 1120, 1124.)

“Where the maximum population deviation between the largest and smallest district is less than 10 [percent], the Court has held, a state or local legislative map presumptively complies with the one-person, one-vote rule.” (*Ibid.*) By contrast, maximum deviations above 10 percent are “presumptively impermissible.” (*Ibid.*) “Maximum population deviation” refers to the sum of the percentage deviations from the perfect population equality of the most- and least-populated districts. (*Id.* at p. 1124, fn. 2.) For example, if the smallest district in a plan is 6 percent below the “perfect” population and the largest district in a plan is 5 percent above the “perfect” population, then the maximum population deviation is 11 percent.

Applying the guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court, the Commission ensured districts maintained a population size within +/- 5 percent of the ideal. The ideal size of a district is 89,341 persons. The Commission’s districts achieved an average deviation of 3.29 percent.

#### *Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment*

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, this text prohibits certain forms of racial gerrymandering in drawing electoral districts. (*Miller v. Johnson* (1995) 515 U.S. 900, 916, 920.) Specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that a state’s “predominant” use of race in drawing district lines is only permissible when it satisfies the Court’s “strict scrutiny” standard, meaning the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. (*Ibid.*) Simply put, a redistricting body violates the federal Constitution if race is the *predominant* factor in determining which voters to put where and the use of race was *unjustified*.

Importantly, *considering* race during redistricting is not the same as allowing racial considerations to “predominate.” Redistricting bodies, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, “will . . . almost always be aware of racial demographics” (*Miller, supra*, 515 U.S. at p. 916), and race does not predominate “merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race” (*Bush v. Vera* (1996) 517 U.S. 952, 958–959.) “Nor does [strict scrutiny] apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts,” as required by the Voting Rights Act. (*Ibid.*) Rather, the Supreme Court has stated that race “predominates” where a redistricting body “subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.” (*Miller, supra*, 515 U.S. at p. 916; see also *Cooper v. Harris* (2017) 137 S.Ct. 1455, 1464–1465 [predominance “entails demonstrating that the legislature ‘subordinated’ other factors—compactness, respect for political subdivisions, partisan advantage, what have you—to ‘racial considerations’”].)

Critically, even if race is the predominant reason for moving some significant population into or out of a district, the districting process is not necessarily unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court has explained that a predominant focus on race does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. (*Miller, supra*, 515 U.S. at p. 920.) The Supreme Court has never directly stated what sort of state interest is adequately compelling to survive strict scrutiny in the redistricting context, but it has repeatedly assumed that compliance with the Voting Rights Act serves as a “compelling governmental interest” that would justify drawing districts based predominantly on race. (E.g., *Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections* (2017) 137 S.Ct. 788, 801 [“As in previous cases, therefore, the Court assumes, without deciding, that the State’s interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act was compelling.”].)

“When a State justifies the predominant use of race in redistricting on the basis of the need to comply with the Voting Rights Act, ‘the narrow tailoring requirement insists only that the legislature have a strong basis in evidence in support of the (race-based) choice that it has made.’” (*Ibid.*, quoting *Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama* (2015) 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1274.) Put another way, if the redistricting body has a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that the “creation of a majority-minority district is reasonably necessary to comply with § 2 [of the Voting Rights Act], and the districting that is based on race substantially addresses the § 2 violation, it satisfies strict scrutiny.” (*Vera, supra*, 517 U.S. at p. 977, citations omitted.)

The Commission’s map-drawing process complied with these principles because it relied on race-neutral, traditional redistricting criteria as its primary focus in crafting district lines, even in areas where the Commission needed to ensure district lines were consistent with the Voting Rights Act. While the Commission was aware of and sensitive to the Census data and demographics of the areas under review—particularly in areas with sizeable minority populations, evidence of racially polarized voting, and a history of discrimination—race was not the sole or predominant criterion used to draw district lines.

Rather, the Commission’s iterative process weighed a host of traditional, race-neutral redistricting criteria and made a substantial effort to focus on the shared interests and community relationships that belonged together for fair and effective representation of all of the people of the Santa Barbara County when drawing district lines.

## **b. Criterion Two: Federal Voting Rights Act**

The Commission’s second criterion in order of priority is that districts comply with the federal Voting Rights Act. Congress enacted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in an effort to combat minority vote dilution. Section 2 provides that no “standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color” or membership in a language minority group. (52 U.S.C. §§ 10301(a), 10303(f)(2).) “A violation [of Section 2] is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes . . . are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to

elect representatives of their choice.” (52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).)

In 1982, Congress clarified that Section 2 plaintiffs need not prove that “a contested electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose.” (*Thornburg v. Gingles* (1986) 478 U.S. 30, 35.) Rather, a “violation [can] be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone.” (*Ibid.*) Accordingly, a Section 2 violation occurs where “a contested electoral practice or structure results in members of a protected group having less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” (*Id.* at p. 63.) Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has invoked Section 2 to strike down legislative redistricting plans that result in minority vote dilution as defined by Section 2. (See *League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry* (2006) 548 U.S. 399, 423–443 (*LULAC*).)

A single-member redistricting scheme can run afoul of Section 2 either through “cracking” or “packing” minority voters. “Cracking” occurs when a redistricting plan fragments a “minority group that is large enough to constitute the majority in a single-member district . . . among various districts so that it is a majority in none.” (*Voinovich v. Quilter* (1993) 507 U.S. 146, 153.) “If the majority in each district votes as a bloc against the minority[-preferred] candidate, the fragmented minority group will be unable to muster sufficient votes in any district to carry its candidate to victory.” (*Ibid.*; see also *LULAC*, *supra*, 548 U.S. at pp. 427–443 [redistricting program violated Section 2 by reducing Latino citizen voting-age population from 57.5 percent to 46 percent in challenged district].) “Packing,” on the other hand, occurs when a redistricting plan results in excessive concentration of minority voters within a district, thereby depriving minority voters of influence in surrounding districts. (*Voinovich*, *supra*, 507 U.S. at p. 153; see, e.g., *Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine* (8th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3d 1011, 1016–1019 [finding a Section 2 violation where Native Americans comprised 86 percent of the voting-age population in a district].)

The Supreme Court has articulated a number of elements that are used to assess Section 2 liability. As an initial matter, liability cannot be established unless the three so-called “*Gingles* preconditions” articulated by the Court in *Thornburg v. Gingles* are satisfied. (See *Grove v. Emison* (1993) 507 U.S. 25, 37–42.) The *Gingles* preconditions are as follows:

“First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”

“Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.”

“Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”

(*Gingles*, *supra*, 478 U.S. at pp. 50–51.)<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> The “majority” does not actually have to be White (as opposed to some other racial group), or even comprised of a single racial group, in order to satisfy the third *Gingles* precondition. (See *Gomez v. City of Watsonville* (9th Cir. 1988) 863 F.2d 1407, 1417 [“Although

With respect to the first *Gingles* precondition—a sufficiently large and geographically compact minority group—a minority group is sufficiently large only where “the minority population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.” (*Bartlett v. Strickland* (2009) 556 U.S. 1, 20 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Alito, J.)). Although the Supreme Court has not expressly defined the proper measure of “minority population,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has endorsed the use of citizen voting age population (“CVAP”) statistics, rather than total population or voting-age population statistics, to satisfy the first *Gingles* precondition. (*Romero v. City of Pomona* (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 [“The district court was correct in holding that eligible minority voter population, rather than total minority population, is the appropriate measure of geographical compactness.”]), abrogated on other grounds, *Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.* (9th Cir. 1990) 914 F.2d 1136 [en banc]; see also *LULAC*, *supra*, 548 U.S. at p. 429 [observing, in dicta, that CVAP “fits the language of § 2 because only eligible voters affect a group’s opportunity to elect candidates”].)<sup>3</sup>

Further, the *Gingles* “compactness” inquiry focuses on the compactness of the *minority population*, not the shape of the district itself. (*LULAC*, *supra*, 548 U.S. at p. 433.) “[W]hile no precise rule has emerged governing [*Gingles*] compactness, the inquiry should take into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries.” (*Ibid.*, quotation marks and citations omitted.) A district that “reaches out to grab small and apparently isolated minority communities” is not reasonably compact. (*Vera*, *supra*, 517 U.S. at p. 979.) Nonetheless, a minority population may be “geographically compact” for *Gingles* purposes even if it is not strictly contiguous. That is, two non-contiguous minority populations “in reasonably close proximity” could form a “geographically compact” minority group if they “share similar interests” with each other. (*LULAC*, *supra*, 548 U.S. at p. 435.)<sup>4</sup>

---

the court did not separately find that Anglo bloc voting occurs, it is clear that the non-Hispanic majority in Watsonville usually votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority votes plus any crossover votes.”]; *Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.* (S.D. Fla. 1992) 805 F.Supp. 967, 976 & fn. 14 [“In order to prove the third prong in *Gingles*, Black Plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate that the Non-Black majority votes sufficiently as a bloc . . . Non-Blacks refer to Hispanics and Non-Hispanic Whites.”], *affd.* in part & *revd.* in part on other grounds (11th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2d 1471.)

<sup>3</sup> The decennial Census does not collect or report actual data to establish citizenship. However, the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (“ACS”) provides a rolling estimate of citizen voting age population or CVAP in a given geographic area over a 5-year period. The Census Bureau has issued disclaimers cautioning users about the inherent unreliability of this data, and explains that it cannot be used as an estimate of a specific population at a specific point in time. Nevertheless, because of the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, the Commission needed to use the most readily available and commonly used data in order to make its determinations about whether the Voting Rights Act required the drawing of certain districts. Exercising its best judgment, the Commission relied on CVAP data from the California Statewide Database as the best available data.

<sup>4</sup> “Because *Gingles* advances a functional evaluation of whether the minority population is large enough to form a district in the first instance, the Circuits have been flexible in assessing

The second and third *Gingles* preconditions are often referred to collectively as “racially polarized voting” and are considered together. Courts first assess whether a politically cohesive minority group exists, i.e., “a significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same candidates.” (*Gingles, supra*, 478 U.S. at p. 56.) Then, courts look for legally significant majority bloc voting, i.e., a pattern in which the majority’s “bloc vote . . . normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus [majority] ‘crossover votes.’” (*Ibid.*) This analysis typically requires expert testimony. (See, e.g., *id.* at pp. 53–74 [considering expert testimony regarding minority group’s lack of success in past elections].)

Once the *Gingles* preconditions have been satisfied, a court must then consider whether, based on the “‘totality of the circumstances,’ minorities have been denied an ‘equal opportunity’ to ‘participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.’” (*Abrams v. Johnson* (1997) 521 U.S. 74, 90, quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).)<sup>5</sup>

With the legal framework of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in mind, the Commission

---

the showing made for this precondition.” (*Sanchez v. State of Colorado* (10th Cir. 1996) 97 F.3d 1303, 1311; see *Houston v. Lafayette County, Miss.* (5th Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 606, 611.)

<sup>5</sup> Courts look to the following non-exhaustive list of factors (the so-called “Senate Factors,” based on the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to Section 2) to determine whether, based on the totality of circumstances, a Section 2 violation exists:

- (1) “[W]hether the number of districts in which the minority group forms an effective majority is roughly proportional to its share of the population in the relevant area.” (*LULAC, supra*, 548 U.S. at p. 426.) “[T]he proper geographic scope for assessing proportionality [is] statewide.” (*Id.* at p. 437.)
- (2) “[T]he extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise participate in the democratic process.” (*Gingles, supra*, 478 U.S. at pp. 36–37, quoting Sen. Rep. No. 97-417, 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 206–207.)
- (3) “[T]he extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” (*Id.* at p. 37.)
- (4) “[T]he extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.” (*Ibid.*)
- (5) “[I]f there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to the process.” (*Ibid.*)
- (6) “[T]he extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.” (*Ibid.*)

worked to identify areas of the County where, at least potentially, a geographically compact concentration of a minority community could form a majority (50 percent or greater CVAP) in a district. In the case of Santa Barbara County, the most relevant minority community is the Latino community. To assist counsel in forming its legal judgment about potential Section 2-required districts, counsel hired Dr. Megan Gall, with the Commission's approval, to help evaluate the evidence on racially polarized voting in the County where the Commission identified significant concentrations of Latinos.

In the judgment of the Commission's Voting Rights Act counsel, there were sufficient indicia that the *Gingles* preconditions had been satisfied with respect to a geographically compact Latino population in the northern part of the County, and there was sufficient evidence concerning the totality of the circumstances, that there would likely be a Section 2 violation if a Latino opportunity district was not drawn.

Based on this advice, which the Commission evaluated and accepted, the Commission chose to draw District 5 as a Latino opportunity district, employing both racial/ethnic data and traditional redistricting criteria to the extent practicable.

#### **c. Criterion Three: California Voting Rights Act**

The Commission's third criterion in order of priority is that districts comply with the California Voting Rights Act (the "CVRA"). The CVRA, Elections Code section 14025 et seq., was enacted in 2001 to implement the equal protection and voting guarantees of the California Constitution. The law makes it unlawful for jurisdictions to maintain an at-large elections under certain circumstances. Because the Commission has drawn a map that is district-based, it has complied with the CVRA.

#### **d. Criterion Four: Contiguity**

The Commission's fourth criterion in order of priority is that districts be, to the extent practicable, geographically contiguous. The California Supreme Court has endorsed a "functional" approach to contiguity as it appeared in prior iterations of the California Constitution. (See *Wilson v. Eu* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 707, 725 [approving special masters' "concept of functional contiguity and compactness"].) Although there is no judicial decision interpreting the term "contiguous" under state law, the Commission has relied on commonly accepted interpretations of contiguity that focus on ensuring that areas within a district are connected to each other.

All of the Commission's districts are geographically contiguous. With respect to the Channel Islands within the jurisdiction of Santa Barbara County, the Commission opted to include these islands within District 2. The islands are not accessible through regular ferry service embarking from Santa Barbara County.

#### **e. Criterion Five & Criterion Six: Integrity of Neighborhoods, Communities of Interest, Cities & Census Designated Places**

The Commission's fifth criterion in order of priority is that districts be drawn, to the

extent practicable, in a manner that respects the geographic integrity of local neighborhoods and local communities of interest. Similarly, the Commission's sixth criterion in order of priority is that districts be drawn, to the extent practicable, in a manner that respects the geographic integrity of cities and census designated places. Accordingly, applicable law calls on the Commission to prioritize the geographic integrity of neighborhoods and communities of interest over that of cities and census designated places.

State and county law define a "community of interest" as a population that shares common social or economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation. (Elec. Code § 21500, subd. (c)(2); Santa Barbara County Code, § 2-10.9A, subd. (6)(a)(6).) Moreover, the California Constitution provides several examples of such shared interests: "those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process." (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(4).) And, as noted above, communities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates. (Elec. Code § 21500, subd. (c)(2); Santa Barbara County Code, § 2-10.9A, subd. (6)(a)(6).)

Because public input is critical to respecting the geographic integrity of communities, the Commission undertook an energetic public engagement campaign that involved not only traditional meetings and hearings with opportunities for public comment virtually, in person, and in writing, but also community outreach by individual commissioners, dedicated outreach to more than 200 community-based organizations, a robust multilingual website, and through social media and multilingual traditional media outlets. For example, as of December 4, 2021, the Commission published 36 redistricting posts on Facebook, with a total reach of 135,582 and 6,115 total engagements.

The Commission also provided numerous tools that allowed Santa Barbara County residents to tell the Commission about their community and submit draft maps directly to the Commission.

In total, the Commission held over three dozen meetings and hearings throughout the County, received over a thousand public comments, and collected 114 draft maps from members of the public. A public record of these meetings, hearings, comments, and draft maps is available on the Commission's website (<https://drawsantabarbaracounty.org>).

This robust public input process began long before the Commission considered any draft maps and continued through the end of the process. Relying heavily on public testimony, the Commission sought to minimize the division of geographic units, to the extent practicable, by using an iterative approach, in which the Commission deliberated options to first minimize the splitting of neighborhoods and communities of interest and then minimize the splitting of cities and census designated places. In the end, the final map includes only four splits in cities and census designated places: Santa Maria, Goleta, Eastern Goleta Valley, and Santa Barbara.

**f. Criterion Seven: Easily Identifiable & Understandable Boundaries**

The Commission's seventh criterion in order of priority is that district boundaries should be easily identifiable and understandable by residents. According to state law, this means that districts should, to the extent practicable, be bounded by natural and artificial barriers, streets, or the boundaries of the County. (Elec. Code § 21500, subd. (c)(4).)

Each of the Commission's districts has boundaries that are easily comprehensible. All boundaries are defined by streets, roads, highways, railroads, the borders of local governmental bodies, ridgelines, creeks, and rivers.

**g. Criterion Eight: Compactness**

The Commission's eighth criterion in order of priority is that, to the extent practicable, and where it does not conflict with the preceding criteria, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographic compactness in a manner that nearby areas of population are not bypassed in favor of more distant populations.

The Commission's districts are geographically compact, both to the extent practicable and in light of other higher-ranked criteria such as compliance with the United States Constitution, the federal Voting Rights Act, contiguity, the integrity of neighborhoods, communities of interest, cities, and census designated places, and easily identifiable and understandable boundaries.

**h. No Purposeful Favoritism For or Discrimination Against Political Parties, Incumbents, or Political Candidates**

In addition to being driven by the above-mentioned redistricting criteria, the Commission is prohibited from adopting district boundaries for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against political parties, incumbents, or political candidates. The Commission did not take into account partisan considerations—neither partisan affiliation, incumbent status, nor the residences of incumbents or political candidates—when drawing districts.

**III. DETAILS ABOUT THE DISTRICTS**

Set forth below is a discussion of each district drawn by the Commission. Details about each district are provided in the appendices attached to this report. In addition, an interactive version of the final map is available on the Commission's website (<https://drawsantabarbaracounty.org>). The official version of the final map and accompanying data have been delivered to the Santa Barbara County Clerk, Recorder, and Assessor and Registrar of Voters.

**District 1** includes the South Coast cities and communities of Carpinteria, Toro Canyon, Summerland, Montecito, and Mission Canyon. It also includes the majority of the City of Santa Barbara—specifically, its downtown, eastside, westside, and foothill areas—and the portion of Eastern Goleta Valley adjacent to San Marcos Pass. These areas have a mix of working-class and wealthier areas. They are connected by the highway corridors of US-101 and CA-192. There is a

shared interest in the waterfront and tourism, as well as fire, watershed, and recreational concerns of the foothills. Cuyama and New Cuyama are also placed in this district, even though they are separated from the rest of the district's population by vast stretches of mountainous wilderness. That is because distant Cuyama Valley is no closer to any other population in the county, and the valley residents expressed a desire to remain in District 1 for reasons related to constituent services.

**District 2** includes the community of Isla Vista and the campus of the University of California, Santa Barbara, which surrounds it. It also includes the majority of Eastern Goleta Valley, also known as "Noleta," as well as the portion of the City of Goleta adjacent to Eastern Goleta Valley. Additionally, the district includes a portion of the City of Santa Barbara—specifically, its mesa, uptown, and airport areas. These areas have a mix of student-centered and wealthier areas. They are connected by the highway corridors of US-101 and CA-217. There is a shared interest in the waterfront and coastal issues, as well as higher education. The Channel Islands are also placed in this district because they are closest to this stretch of coastline, and the main harbor in the County is located in this district.

**District 3** includes the Santa Ynez Valley cities and communities of Buellton, Solvang, Santa Ynez, Ballard, and Los Olivos, including the Santa Ynez Reservation of Chumash Indians. It also includes the City of Lompoc in its entirety, as well as the majority of the City of Goleta, including its Old Town neighborhood. These areas have a mix of working-class and wealthier areas. They are connected by the highway corridors of US-101, CA-1, CA-154, and CA-246. There is a shared interest in agriculture, as well as fire, watershed, and recreational concerns. Public testimony also supported uniting the Chumash reservation with their historical homeland along the Gaviota Coast up to Point Conception, which this district achieves.


**District 4** includes the Lompoc Valley communities of Mission Hills, Vandenberg Village, and Vandenberg Space Force Base, as well as the North County communities of Los Alamos, Sisquoc, Garey, Casmalia, and Orcutt. It also includes a portion of the City of Santa Maria—specifically, its far southern, southeastern, and far eastern areas. These areas have a mix of military-centered and middle-class areas. They are connected by the highway corridors of US-101, CA-1, and CA-135. There is a shared interest in agriculture and the military. The City of Santa Maria is split in this district to achieve population equality and due to an adjacent district drawn in consideration of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

**District 5** includes the City of Guadalupe, as well as the majority of the City of Santa Maria—specifically, its southwestern, northwestern, and northeastern areas. These areas are predominantly working-class. They are connected by the highway corridor of CA-166. There is a shared interest in agriculture and immigrant concerns. Public testimony supported a common community of interest shared by Guadalupe and Northwest Santa Maria. In particular, the common social and economic interests include the interests of farmworkers, traffic on CA-166, environmental concerns related to pollution, as well as higher rates of non-English speakers, non-citizens, and renters. This district was also drawn to provide Latino voters the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

## **Appendix 1: Final Map & District Statistics**

# Final Preferred Plan

## Santa Barbara County 2021 Redistricting




Total Population Deviation: 7.7%  
Maximum Latino CVAP: 67%  
Number of Split Places: 4



Santa Barbara County - Final Preferred Plan							
Category	Field	1	2	3	4	5	Total
2020 Census	Total Population	90,866	92,054	92,437	85,764	85,583	446,704
	Population Deviation	1,525	2,713	3,096	-3,577	-3,758	6,854
	Pct. Deviation	1.71%	3.04%	3.47%	-4.00%	-4.21%	7.67%
Total Pop.	Hispanic/Latino	39%	26%	44%	46%	83%	47%
	NH White	53%	55%	43%	43%	10%	41%
	NH Black	1%	2%	3%	2%	1%	2%
	NH Asian/Pac.Isl.	5%	15%	8%	7%	5%	8%
	NH Native Amer.	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Citizen Voting Age Pop	Total	63,666	72,497	55,614	55,500	32,249	279,525
	Hisp	23%	21%	30%	29%	67%	30%
	NH White	70%	66%	59%	60%	23%	60%
	NH Black	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%
	Asian/Pac.Isl.	4%	10%	7%	8%	7%	7%
	Native Amer.	1%	1%	2%	2%	0%	1%
Voter Registration (Nov 2020)	Total	57,520	54,808	51,075	46,835	27,981	238,219
	Latino est.	23%	19%	30%	32%	72%	31%
	Spanish-Surnamed	21%	17%	27%	29%	66%	29%
	Asian-Surnamed	2%	4%	2%	2%	1%	2%
	Filipino-Surnamed	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	1%
	NH White est.	75%	77%	67%	67%	28%	68%
	NH Black	2%	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%
Voter Turnout (Nov 2020)	Total	50,846	47,796	43,405	39,746	20,266	202,059
	Latino est.	21%	17%	26%	29%	68%	28%
	Spanish-Surnamed	20%	16%	25%	27%	63%	26%
	Asian-Surnamed	2%	4%	2%	2%	1%	2%
	Filipino-Surnamed	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	1%
	NH White est.	75%	77%	67%	67%	28%	68%
	NH Black	2%	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%
Voter Turnout (Nov 2018)	Total	39,465	40,261	31,698	28,830	11,953	152,207
	Latino est.	17%	16%	20%	22%	58%	22%
	Spanish-Surnamed	16%	15%	19%	21%	55%	20%
	Asian-Surnamed	2%	4%	2%	2%	1%	2%
	Filipino-Surnamed	1%	1%	1%	1%	3%	1%
	NH White est.	79%	77%	73%	73%	35%	73%
	NH Black est.	2%	2%	3%	2%	3%	2%
Age	age0-19	21%	25%	27%	27%	37%	27%
	age20-60	52%	54%	52%	51%	52%	52%
	age60plus	27%	21%	21%	21%	12%	20%
Immigration	immigrants	22%	19%	21%	16%	39%	23%
	naturalized	39%	40%	40%	41%	22%	34%
Language spoken at home	english	67%	69%	64%	70%	26%	60%
	spanish	28%	19%	30%	25%	70%	33%
	asian-lang	2%	7%	3%	3%	3%	4%
	other lang	3%	6%	3%	2%	1%	3%
Language Fluency	Speaks Eng. "Less than Very Well"	13%	10%	16%	13%	39%	18%
Education (among those age 25+)	hs-grad	32%	31%	45%	47%	38%	39%
	bachelor	27%	30%	18%	18%	6%	20%
	graduatedegree	21%	23%	12%	10%	3%	14%
Child in Household	child-under18	24%	21%	36%	36%	57%	32%
Pct of Pop. Age 16+	employed	66%	59%	67%	65%	68%	65%
Household Income	income 0-25k	14%	20%	16%	10%	15%	15%
	income 25-50k	16%	17%	20%	18%	26%	19%
	income 50-75k	16%	13%	16%	19%	21%	17%
	income 75-200k	34%	36%	40%	44%	36%	38%
	income 200k-plus	20%	14%	9%	9%	2%	12%
Housing Stats	single family	65%	57%	72%	84%	73%	69%
	multi-family	35%	43%	28%	16%	27%	31%
	rented	51%	54%	47%	36%	50%	48%
	owned	49%	46%	53%	64%	50%	52%
Total population data from California's adjusted 2020 Census data. Citizen Voting Age Population, Age, Immigration, and other demographics from the 2015-2019 American Community Survey and Special Tabulation 5-year data. Turnout and Registration data from California Statewide Database ("Latino" figures calculated by NDC using Census Bureau's Latino undercount by surname estimate).							

## **Appendix 2: District Maps**


# Santa Barbara County Supervisory District 1



# Santa Barbara County Supervisory District 2




District 2 also includes Santa Barbara Island, which lies to the southeast of the map extent.




# Santa Barbara County Supervisorial District 3

# Santa Barbara County Supervisory District 4



# Santa Barbara County Supervisory District 5

National Demographics Corporation, December 6, 2021



## **Appendix 3: Commission Members**



Glenn Morris, Fifth District, Chair Commissioner  
Megan Turley, Second District, Vice Chair Commissioner  
Commissioner Cheryl Trosky, First District Commissioner  
Karen Twibell, First District Commissioner  
William McClintock, Second District Commissioner  
Norman “Doug” Bradley, Third District Commissioner  
Kevin Kaseff, Third District Commissioner  
James Bray, Fourth District Commissioner  
Amanda Ochoa, Fourth District Commissioner  
Michael Hartman, Fifth District Commissioner  
Jannet Rios, Member-At-Large

Biographies of the Commission’s members are available on the Commission’s website (<https://drawsantabarbaracounty.org>).